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road Company, delivered addresses at the first session which was
held on Friday evening. Mr. Ashley Sellers of the Department
of Agriculture and Mr. Stanley S. Surrey of the Treasury De-
partment delivered addresses Saturday morning and afternoon,
respectively. All of these addresses appear in this issue of the
Law Quarterly. Each of these addresses, except the first, was
followed by discussion of the issues that were raised by the
respective speakers. These discussions are also published in this
issue of the Quarterly and will be found immediately following
the address to which they relate.
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
BILLs AND Noms-Ficrnious PAYEE-KNOWLEDGE OF AGENT IMPUTED
TO PRINCIPAL-[Missouri] .- Plaintiff's assignor, a corporation, authorized
defendant bank to honor checks co-signed by one of its clerks and one of its
officers. The clerk also had authority to negotiate checks and deliver them
to payees. The clerk prepared and signed checks payable to persons to whom
the corporation was not indebted, obtained the signature of an officer, and,
having forged the indorsement of the payee, negotiated the checks. In due
course these checks were honored by defendant and charged to the account
of plaintiff's assignor. Upon discovery of the fraud and following an assign-
ment of the claim, plaintiff brought an action to recover the amount of
the checks. Held, the checks were payable to bearer under the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, and defendant was therefore not liable for their
payment.'
Section 9 (3) of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides that an instru-
ment is payable to bearer when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or
non-existing person and such fact was known to the person making it so
payable.2 A payee whom the maker of a check does not intend to have an
interest therein is a "fictitious payee" within the meaning of this section.a
Under these circumstances there can be no recovery against a bank honoring
the check for failure to discover the forged indorsement, since no indorse-
ment is required on a bearer instrument.
Where the check is issued by a corporation acting through agents, the
requirement of the N. I. L. that such fiction in the instrument be known to,
"the person making it so payable" raises the question whether "the person"
referred to is the corporation, as legal or ultimate drawer of the check, or
the agent actually signing for that drawer, since their knowledge is not
1. Globe Indemnity Co. v. First Nat'l Bank (Mo. App. 1939) 133 S. W(2d) 1066.
2. R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 2638.
3. Bigelow, Bills, Notes and Checks (3d ed. 1928) 96-98, secs. 150-152.
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always identical. The former interpretation apparently is accepted only by
Missouri,4 while the latter is that of a great majority of jurisdictions.5
Where a clerk with no authority to sign checks causes checks to be drawn
to fictitious payees and signed by an authorized officer of the corporation,
who has no knowledge of the fraud, it is agreed that the checks are not
bearer paper, and recovery by the corporate principal from the drawee bank
is per nitted.4 The majority bases this on the fact that the officer signing
the check-"the person making it so payable" under its interpretation of
the N. I. L.-has no actual knowledge of the fraud.7 Knowledge of the
clerk is immaterial.8 However, Missouri, which regards the corporation as
"the person making it so payable," reaches the same result by holding that
the knowledge of an agent will not be imputed to his corporate principal
where the agent has no authority to act.9
Where an agent with authority to sign checks draws them to fictitious
payees and then, by forging the indorsement, causes them to be negotiated,
it is agreed that such checks are bearer paper; and recovery by the cor-
porate principal from the drawee bank is denied.10 The majority reaches
4. Equitable Life Assur. Co. v. National Bank of Commerce (Mo. App.
1916) 181 S. W. 1176; but see dictum in Jones v. People's Bank Co. (1917)
95 Ohio St. 253, 116 N. E. 34.
5. Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law (6th ed. 1938) 208, and cases
cited.
6. Ibid.
7. Note (1939) 13 Ohio L. Reporter 334, 336, and cases there cited. Some
of the earlier decisions in this group seem to treat the corporation as "the
person making it so payable," but this reasoning becomes less forceful in
later cases and for all practical purposes is repudiated by language in
recent cases of the second group. Application of this doctrine by the Illinois
Court in U. S. Cold Storage Co. v. Central Mfg. District Bank (1931) 343
Ill. 503, 175 N. E. 825, 74 A. L. R. 811, led to a change in the N. I. L. of
that state to hold the principal liable if the payee was known to be fictitious
by any agent or employee who supplied the name of such payee. Ill. Smith-
Hurd Ann. Stats. (1935) c. 98, sec. 29 (approved 1931).
8. There is no need to consider whether the dishonest clerk's knowledge
may be imputed to the corporate principal; and if there is no principal-
agent relation between the officer and the clerk, the clerk's knowledge can-
not be imputed to the drawing officer, whose knowledge is important under
this view.
9. "In determining whether the checks were payable to bearer under
our statute we are not concerned with * * * [one's] authority in the com-
pany's other activities, but solely with his agential powers in the execution
of checks; and as to that he had none." American Sash & Door Co. v.
Commerce Trust Co. (1933) 332 Mo. 98, 116, 56 S. W. (2d) 1034. Missouri
further divides the execution of checks into signing and circulating, and
imputes guilty knowledge acquired during the performance of either act to
the principal to bar recovery; but a distinction is made between an agent
with discretionary power to make or withhold delivery and a mere messen-
ger-boy. This distinction is used to explain divergent results in two appar-
ently similar cases: Equitable Life Assur. Co. v. National Bank of Com-
merce (Mo. App. 1916) 181 S. W. 1176; American Sash & Door Co. v.
Commercial Trust Co. (1933) 332 Mo. 98, 56 S. W. (2d) 1034; and see Bran-
nan, op. cit. supra note 5, at 222.
10. Globe Indemnity Co. v. First Nat'l Bank (Mo. App. 1939) 133 S. W.
(2d) 1066; Brannan, op. cit. supra note 5, at 214.
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this result by treating the fraudulent agent who signed the check as "the
person making it so payable" whose knowledge of the fiction is required
under the N. I. L. and then ruling that since the act of drawing the check
is within the apparent scope of the agent's authority the principal is
estopped from denying the validity of the check as a bearer instrument.11
Since it takes the position that the person who must have knowledge of the
fiction is the ultimate drawer, the corporation, Missouri denies recovery by
imputing the knowledge of the dishonest agent to his principal. This is the
reasoning of the instant case.
The court in its opinion fails to distinguish between knowledge acquired
by an agent while pursuing a course adverse to the interests of his prin-
cipal, which knowledge will not be imputed to the principal,12 and the act
of an agent done within the scope of his authority for the consequences of
which the principal will be liable although the act was done to defraud
him.1 3 It is the latter principle which prevents recovery where an authorized
agent makes checks payable to fictitious payees; and hence only under the
majority view of who is "the person making it so payable" can section 9 (3)
of the N. I. L. be applied without doing violence to accepted principles of
agency.14
In the instant case the requirement of two signatures to give validity to
the check does not affect the result under either view, since liability or
knowledge need come from only one of several possible sources and once
attached remains absolute.10
J. J. T.
CONSTiTUTIONAL LAW - FEDERAL PRIVILEGES AND II MMUNITIES - STATE
TAXATION- COLGATE v. HARVEY OVERRULE - [United States]. -Kentucky
passed a statute' imposing upon its residents a tax of fifty cents per hundred
dollars on bank deposits held without the state and a tax of ten cents per
hundred dollars on those held within the state. Appellant's decedent had
11. Mueller & Martin v. Liberty Insurance Bank (1920) 187 Ky. 44, 218
S. W. 465; American Hominy Co. v. Millikin Nat'l Bank (D. C. S. D. Ill.
1920) 273 Fed. 550; Phillips v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank (1894) 140 N. Y. 556,
35 N. E. 982, 37 Am. St. Rep. 596, 23 L. R. A. 584; Snyder v. Corn Exch.
Nat'l Bank (1908) 221 Pa. 599, 70 Atl. 876, 128 Am. St. Rep. 780.
12. American Nat'l Bank v. Miller (1913) 229 U. S. 517; 1 Restatement,
Agency (1933) sec. 282.
13. Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. (1929) 278 U. S. 349.
14. This distinction is recognized by the Kentucky Court in Mueller &
Martin v. Liberty Insurance Bank (1920) 187 Ky. 44, 49, 218 S. W. 465;
and is followed with some confusion of terms in Los Angeles Inv. Co. v.
Home Savings Bank (1919) 180 Cal. 601, 182 Pac. 293, 5 A. L. R. 1193.
And see Comment (1924) 24 Col. L. Rev. 671.
15. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co.
(1934) 1 Cal. App. (2d) 694, 37 Pac. (2d) 483; Pennsylvania Co. to the
Use of Royal Indemnity Co. v. Federal Res. Bank (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1939) 30
F. Supp. 982. As to the commercial advisability of letting the fraudulent
intent of one of several signers determine the character of the instrument,
see Brannan, op. cit. supra note 5, at 217.
1. Ky. Carroll's Stats. (Baldwin's Rev. 1936) sec. 4019a-1.
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